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Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Luxury: eBay's
Liability for Contributory Trademark Infringement in
the United States, Germany, and France
Sofia H. Ahmea

1. INTRODUCTION

Tales of consumer woes abound after disgruntled eBay customers
recognize they have been duped into purchasing counterfeit luxury
items for too-good-to-be-true prices. Luxury goods trademark
holders are likewise disgruntled about the proliferation of counterfeit
versions of their products appearing on eBay. Despite customer
complaints and protective trademark holders, eBay has gained a
reputation as a haven for counterfeit goods. 1
To protect the interests of customers and trademark holders,
eBay must first consider the approach to trademark regulation
adopted by a given jurisdiction. Secondary markets like eBay present
a difficult regulatory challenge to which there is no obvious solution.
One possible approach would be to require consumers to be more
wary in their purchases and trademark owners to be more vigilant in
their enforcement. Another approach would make the government
or trademark owners-not eBay-responsible for all trademark
enforcement. A third alternative would require eBay to bear the
entire burden of trademark enforcement. Regardless of where the
regulatory burden rests, more strict regulation of trademark
infringements is imperative if eBay is to continue dealing in luxury
goods.
Recent court decisions in lawsuits against eBay filed in the
United States, Germany, and France have yielded divergent results,
leaving all involved uncertain of eBay's status as an international
* J.D. candidate, University of La Verne College of Law (2010); M.A., Califilfllia
Polytechnic University, Pomona (2007); B.A., Scripps College (2003). The author would like
to thank Professors Diane KJein and Kevin Marshall ti,r their advice and guidance while
researching and writing this Note. The author would also like to give special thanks to her
parents, Riaz and Shaista Ahmed, and to her sisters, Alia, Hina, and Sana, t(lr all of their love
and support.
I. Sec Portero.com Ruyer~' Protection Plan Protects Consumers Where Law Doesn't,
REllTERS, July IS, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/articie/pressRelease/idUS223801+15-ul2008 +PI,,-"l2 00807 I 5 (citing Prokssor Susan Scatidi).
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dealer in luxury goods. 2 The courts in each of these countries arrived
at different conclusions primarily based on the application and
analysis of their respective trademark and anti-counterfeiting laws.
Luxury goods makers consistently argue that eBay's efforts to curb
the rising threat of counterfeiting are inadequate, as evidenced by the
large number of counterfeit goods found on the site at any given
time. eBay asserts in response that it employs numerous measures to
combat counterfeiting, and that any more would in effect ban the
sale of luxury goods on the site altogether. Thus, the underlying
issue in all three cases is whether eBay's anti-counterfeiting measures
have been sufficient.
This Note will examine the judicial interpretations of trademark
and anti-counterfeiting laws in France, Germany, and the United
States, and the implications of these decisions on eBay and other
online marketplaces. Ultimately, the approach taken by U.S.
trademark law, embodied in the Lanham Act, seems to strike the
most appropriate balance between eBay's interest in allowing loosely
regulated sales and the customers' and trademark holders' interest in
protecting themselves. The Lanham Act requires eBay to engage in
self-monitoring, while also recognizing that trademark rights are
private rights that are most-effectively enforced by the trademark
owner.
Part II of this Note discusses the manner in which the three
jurisdictions approach trademark and counterfeiting issues. It then
examines the historical context of each country's trademark and
counterfeiting laws, as well as some of the rights and remedies
available to trademark holders in each country. Part III looks at
eBay, its operations as a global company, and its potential for usc as a
platform for the sale of luxury goods, both real and counterfeit. This
Part explores eBay's policies and mechanisms to fight the sale of
counterfeit goods and discusses the sufIiciency of these policies.
Parts IV through VI provide detailed explanations of cases
against eBay in the United States, Germany, and France, respectively,
with each lawsuit alleging that the site contributed to trademark
infringement by facilitating the sale of counterfeit luxury goods.
Specifically, Part IV analyzes the United States decision in Tiffany)
Inc. v. eBay) Inc. and consider how the application of previous tests
for contributory trademark infringement led a U.S. District Court to
find in favor of eBay. Part V discusses a German lawsuit against eBay

2. See infra Parts
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that the German Federal Supreme Court remanded for further fact
finding as to the sufficiency of eBay's anti-counterfeiting measures,
although the court's opinion strongly suggests that eBay is indeed
vicariously liablc. 3 Part VI examines three French decisions that have
held eBay grossly negligent for its inadequate anti-counterfeiting
measures and have punished eBay by awarding signitlcant damages. 4
Lastly, Part VII considers what eBay can do, in light of these
decisions, to adequately protect the rights of trademark holders and
consumers without destroying its business model.
II. TRADEMARK AND ANTI-COUNTERFEITING LAWS IN FRANCE,
GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES

Trademark and anti-counterfeiting laws vary from country to
country, making it diHicult for an international online company such
as eBay to adhere to the laws of every nation. This Part introduces
and compares the relevant laws of three prominent nations-France,
Germany, and the United States.
A. France: Early Trademark Protection for Luxury Goods Makers
France houses a number of the world's most recognized luxury
brands, which its legal system aggressively and effectively protects. In
1857, France established the tlrst truly comprehensive trademark
system in the world. s Then in 1994, private sector anticounterfeiting efforts successfully influenced the passage of even
more protective measures, giving customs authorities the power to
seize counterfeit goods. 6 Acting under this authority, French
customs agents seized more than six million items in 2007. 7 Today, a

3. Rundesgerichtshof [RGH) [Federal Court of Justice) Apr. 19, 2007,
Entschiedungen des Rundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [RGHZ] 1149 (F.R.G.).
4. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eRay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.c.]
[Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008; Christian Dior Couture v. eRay, Tribunal de
Commerce de Paris [T.C.) [Commercial Court) Paris, June 30,2008; SA ParhllTIS Christian
Dim v. cBay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.C.) [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30,
2008.
S. The
IP Guide to
France,
II'
REV.
ONLINE,
Oct.
24,
2006,
http://www.cpagl(lbal.C<lln/ip-review-(1llIine/117S/the_ip_guide_to__ trance.
6. Dimitra Kessenides, LVMH to eBay: Knock It Ofjl, AM. LAW., January II, 2007,
al'ailable at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1168471808673.
7. BENOIT RATISTEI.LI, THE FRENCH ANTl-COUNTERfEITlNC; POLICY INPI AND THE
NATIONAL
ANTI-COlJNTERHJTINC;
COMMITTEE
2
(2008),
available
at
http://w\\w.usibc.com/NR/rdonlyres/exw4e2ei4Ib.Ydasxdbohbaypleio7rnkzSdpSviS3kfclr46
bamfzeymm6y66nh III 4 nykk 4 kc7u4 iggcnqtsxS euec7 d/Pn ltectingI P2 7th Battistelli. pd f
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tourist arriving in France with a counterfeit handbag may be fined
and the item may be confiscated. 8
French regulations established a broad system to protect luxury
brand companies from counterfeiting. The 1994 legislation led to
the creation of the Comite National Anti-Contrefa~on (CNAC), or
the National Anti-Counterfeiting Committee.lJ The CNAC derives
its authority from the Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle
(INPI), the National Intellectual Property Otlice of France. lo The
CNAC's primary task is to apprise the public of the "dangers" of
counterfeiting, and to ensure public compliance with anticounterfeiting laws. The CNAC supports the activities of the Colbert
Committee (an association of seventy French luxury goods makers)
which include anti-counterfeiting education campaigns. I I A recent
Colbert Committee poster campaign emphasized the legal
consequences to those purchasing or possessing counterfeit goods. 12
The poster featured visuals of luxury goods (such as Cartier watches,
Louis Vuitton shoes, Christian Dior sunglasses, etc.) and read: "In
France, buying or carrying a counterfeit product is a criminal offense
punishable by up to 3 years imprisonment and a £300,000 fine.
Counterfeiting is a real menace to society.,,13 Current French law, in
addition to imposing fines and jail time, requires mandatory
forfeiture of counterfeit goods. 14 Thus, trademark owners in France
work in concert with the government to combat the proliferation of
counterfeit goods at every level of the distribution chain, including
the consumer level. 15

8. Kessenides, supra note 6.
9. Marie Le Bare, Nobody is Supposed to Ignore the Law!, LE MAGAZINE DE LA HAllTE
HORLOC;ERlE,
Sept.
18,
2007,
http://journal.hautehorlogerie.org/
spip.php?page=article&id3tticle=4S40.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.;
Comite
Colbert,
New
Anti-counterteiting
Campaign,
http://www.c()mitec()lbert.o)m/internet/index.php?()pti(>I1=c()11l_oHltent&task=view&id=23
6&Itemid=221 &lang=en (last visited Aug. 21, 2009); see also Alessandra Galloni, RaJlgincq
Fakers and Sellers-Makers of Luxury Goods Try NelV Le..qal Tactics against ,[71ose Who Aid
Counterfeiters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31,2006, at Bl.
14. See ORC;. fOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEY., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT Of
COUNTERHJTlNG AND PIRACY 231 (2008).

15. Seeid.at231-32.
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B. Germany: Strong Trademark Protection with Initiative Required of
Trademark Owners
Following the establishment of French trademark law, Germany
passed its first trademark act in 1894. 16 A form of that act still exists
today, but the addition in 1995 ofa standard method for registration
changed many aspects of this law. 17 Today, Germany is one of the
European Union's largest commercial markets. Germany's approach
differs from France's approach in that it requires the trademark
holder to take the 101tIative in investigating incidences of
counterfeiting. IK Furthermore, the state only prosecutes infringers
when the counterfeiting is clear and will affect the public interest. 1<)
Nevertheless, German luxury good makers often seek preliminary
injunctions to halt further distribution of infringing goods and to
confiscate counterfeit merchandise. 20
In Germany, unlike other nations in the European Union,
trademark owners may also seek protection under the German Act
against Unfair Competition (UCA).21 For trademark holders to make
a claim under the UCA they must show that the counterfeit goods
are (1) offered for sale in Germany; and (2) "either create avoidable
confusion in consumers' minds as to the product's origin, or exploit
or damage the reputation of rights holders or of their genuine
products.,,22 Additionally, trademark owners from Germany and
France may obtain protection throughout the European Union by
registering their marks under the Community Trademark
Regulation. 23 This directive has increased harmonization, but has left
intra-national trademark law unaffected. 24

16. 7iJe IP Guide to Germany, IP REV. ONLINE, Feb. 15, 2007,
http://www.cpagl()bal.c<)m/ip-review-(>I1line/2331/the_ip_guide_to_germany.
17. Id.
18. Nils Weber & Katja Grabicnski, Anti-counterfeitinll Law and Practice in Germany,
WORLD
TRADEMARK
REV.,
Mar./Apr.
2008,
at
60,
available
at
http://\\'ww. \\'( )rld tradcmarkreview.c< )m/issues/ article .ashx? g=21 a49 3e 3 -7844-499 5 -9bdea25dab87b7ab.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Gesctz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb rUWGj [German Act against Untair
Competition], July 3, 2004, RGRII at 1414.
22. Weber & Grabicnski, supra note 18.
23. Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L II) I, amended by Council Regulation
422/2004 (EC).
24. GEORl;!': A. RERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERlALS ON El7ROPEAN UNION LAW
770 (2d ed. 2002).

251

INTER.c"'lATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW

VOLUME

5

C. The United States: Protection Focusing on Prevention of
Counterfeiting
Trademark law in the United States evolved somewhat differently
than it did in France and Germany, struggling much in its early
stages. The first U.S. trademark statute, the short lived Federal Trade
Mark Act of 1870/ 5 collapsed in 1879 when the Supreme Court
held that the act was unconstitutional because Congress had
improperly relied on the Patent and Copyright Clause (Article 1,
Section 8, Clause 8) to regulate trademarks. 26 Additionally, the
Court held that the act was too broad to fit within Congress' powers
under the Commerce Clause. 27 In 1881, Congress passed new
trademark legislation narrowly tailored to pass muster under its
Commerce Clause powers. Congress substantially revised and
broadened the 1881 act in 1905 as another major step in modern
U.S. trademark regulation.2~
The next major development in U.S. trademark law occurred in
1946 with the passing of the Lanham Act, which imposed civil
penalties for trademark infringement. 29 A few decades later, in 1984,
Congress passed the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, a criminal
trademark infringement statute punishing intentional traffickers of
counterfeit goods or services. 30 Because the Lanham Act is the basis
for the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act criminalizes only conduct prohibited by the
Lanham Act-conduct defined as "traffick[ing],,31 or selling or
trading counterfeit goods. 32 Until recently, criminal liability did not
exist under these statutes for producing or purchasing counterfeit
items. In 2006, however, the United States enacted new legislation
to combat the proliferation of counterfeit goods from Asia. 33
25. PatentActofl870, Ch. 230,16 Stat. 198 (1870).
26. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82,93-94 (1879).
27. Id. at 96-97.
28. Robert G. Bone, Huntin<q Goodwill: A History Iff the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 578 n.162 (2006).
29. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1051-1141 (2008).
30. 18 U.s.c. § 2320 (2008).
31. Id.
32. Id. Trafticking is detined as "trad[ingJ or deal[ing] in (goods, esp. illicit drugs, or
other contraband)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (8th ed. 2004).
33. See Susan Krause, Le.Hislators Detail Concerns About Counterfeit Goods from China,
BUREAU Of INT'L INfO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEl"T Of STi\TE, June 12, 2006,
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2006/J une/20060612124226ASesuarKO.
5563623.html.
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Specifically, the Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act
established new criminal laws dealing with actual counterfeiting. 34
The United States has taken a different approach than that of
France and other nations by focusing its attention on preventing
counterfeiting before it reaches the consumer. In this respect,
American law goes further than French law by attempting to prevent
trade in components that comprise a finished counterfeit good. 35
Individuals and companies are prohibited from trafficking in
counterfeit "labels, patches, stickers, wrappers, badges, emblems,
medallions, charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags,
documentation, or packaging of any type or nature" if those
products are likely to cause confusion. 36 On the other hand, U.S. law
places no responsibility or liability on individuals who seek out (or
inadvertently buy) counterfeit products; in fact, no criminal liability
is incurred when purchasing counterfeit goods in the United States. 37
As a result, trademark holders in the United States must still actively
pursue counterfeiters through their own initiatives.
The above-outlined differences in anti-counterfeiting laws
between jurisdictions pose a challenge to a global company such as
eBay in determining whether its anti-counterfeiting efforts are legally
sufficient in all jurisdictions. Until various nations reach a consensus
as to how best to protect trademark holders, international online
marketplaces such as eBay may have no alternative other than to
withdraw from the luxury goods market altogether, fight a losing
battle, or bear a disproportionate enforcement burden without clear
guidance.

III. EBAY: How IT OPERATES AND ITS ANTI-COUNTERFEITING
MEASURES

eBay, located at www.ebay.com. allows users to buy and sell
from one another. 3x eBay calls itself "the World's Online
Marketplace,,,3lJ and currently boasts 84.5 million active users.40 Its

34. 18 U.s.c. § 2320 (2008).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Galloni, supra note 13.
38. See Brad Stone, Amid the Gloom, An E-Commerce War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,2008,
atBUI.
39. eBay, About d~ay, http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay.html (last visited Aug. 21,
2009) [hereinafter About eBay j.
40. Stone, supra note 38.
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purpose is to "enabl[ e] trade on a local, national and international
basis," and it features "a diverse and passionate community of
individuals and small businesses, [through which] eBay offers an
online platform where millions of items are traded each day. ,,41 eBay
explicitly requires sellers to ensure that their goods do not infringe
on the rights of others and expects intellectual property owners to
monitor the site for infringing items. In addition, eBay provides
"Guidelines for Creating Legally Compliant Listings," which explain
that sellers must not list replicas or counterfeits for sale on its site. 42
eBay has two primary mechanisms to thwart the sale of
counterfeit products: (1) the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO)
Program, and (2) a "fraud engine." VeRO is a notice-and-takedown
system that allows intellectual property owners to report a listing
with a potentially infringing item to eBay, which subsequently
removes the listing. 43 The fraud engine itself operates automatically
and utilizes 13,000 different search rules designed to capture listings
containing signs of counterfeit items. 44 These systems allow eBay to
detect infringing products without requiring its own personnel to
become experts in the brands or products of trademark owners sold
on their site.45
Despite these mechanisms, in 2006 eBay experienced a decline in
active users coupled by a push by intellectual property owners such
as Tiffany, Rolex, and LVHM to eliminate all infringing goods from
the site. 46 This push eventually led to lawsuits worldwide.
Responding to the decline of active users, eBay introduced new
measures to assure users that the site was sate for buyers to useY
One of these new safety measures was the enactment of certain
requirements for the categories listing most of the counterfeit goods.
For example, sellers are limited in the number of auctions they may
list under the "Clothing and Accessories" category, and the length of

41. About eBay, supra note 39.
42. See Brian W. Brokate, What's Nell' in Anticounterfeiting, 947 PLI/PAT 615, 639
(2008).
43. eBay,
How
eBay
Protects
Intellectual
Property
(VeRO),
http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/programs-vero-ov.html (last visited Aug. 21,2(09).
44. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 20(8).
45. Id. See also Keith Kupferschmid, No Silver Lininl! in Tif],any's Infi-in<qemcnt Case,
INHlRMATION TODAY, Sept. 1, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.int()wday.com/it/
sep08/Kupferschmid.shtml.
46. Brad Stone, eRay Reports Prl{qress against Fraud, INT'L HERALD TRIll., June 14,
2007, at F1.
47. Id.
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the sale time is longer than for other categories. Requiring a longer
sale period ensures that sellers cannot take the money and run 48 and
gives eBay a longer period of time to review the listings. 4Y For
Tiffany silver jewelry, for example, the minimum sale period is five
days.50 Geographical restrictions offer further protection by banning
sellers in China and Hong Kong from listing items in the categories
most at1ected by luxury goods counterfeiting, such as
"Accessories. ,,51 The adequacy of these efforts undertaken by eBay to
tIght the sale of counterfeit goods on its site is at issue in all three
cases reviewed below.
IV. UNITED STATES: TIFFANY) INC. V. EEAY, INC.
Among the many luxury brands that have taken issue with eBay,
the jewelry giant Tiffany & Co. has waged a comprehensive anticounterfeiting legal battle against the online marketplace. Tiffany &
Co., established in 1837, is a stationery and "fancy goods
emporium."s2 Tiffany, well known for its luxury goods, is now one
of the world's top jewelry companies. 53 Since 2000, Tiffany's own
retail stores, catalogs, website, and Corporate Sales Department have
exclusively sold new Tiffany jewelry. 54 Tiffany does not explicitly
authorize its merchandise for resale at online marketplaces, such as
eBay, and does not sell its merchandise through liquidators or at
discounted prices. 55
Prior to 2003, Tiffany pursued legal action against individual
eBay sellers of counterfeit Tiffany items, particularly sellers of
counterfeit silver Tiffany jewelry. In that year, however, Tiffany
transitioned from suing individual eBay sellers to suing eBay itself.
Tiffany began the attack on eBay by asking the site to "(i) remove

48. Id.
49. KlIpterschlllid, Jupra note 45.
50. Id.
51. Stone, Jupra note 46.
52. TifT:lny, History & Tillleiine, http://press.tiffany.colll/Localjcn- US/Doc/
History&Tilllelinc.pdf (last visited Aug. 21,2009).
53. SUrJ":v: Harry WinJton 711p Luxury Jewelrv Brand, NAT'L JEWELER, Jan. 18,2007,
http://www.nati(lIlaljeweiernct\\.(lrk.com/njn/c(lIltencdispiay/tJshion/e3i96ed72e4599t72
9559d3tu85b J9t2c40?inp=true; Rigel Celeste, The Top 10 Jewelry BrandJ (As Ranked by
Wealthy COllJumcrJ), LllXIST, Feb. 9, 2008, http://www.lllxist.colll/2008/02/09/the-top10- jewel ry - bran ds-as- ranked -by-wealthy-c( lllSlllllers.
54. Tiffany, Inc. v. eJhy, Inc., 576 F. SlIpp. 2d 463, 472-473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing
Michael Kowalski, President ,md CEO of Tiffany).
!'i5. Id. at 473.
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listings for all Tiffany counterfeit merchandise currently on the eBay
website; and (ii) take appropriate and continuing measures to
eliminate the sale of counterfeit merchandise through the eBay
website in the future; and [( iii)] cease using any 'Tiffany' identifier to
label counterfeit goods. ,,56
According to Tiffany, eBay responded by encouraging Tiffany to
utilize the VeRO program in combination with the efforts made by
eBay to remove listings that contained obvious infringements. 07
Tiffany replied a year later after conducting an illustrative survey in
which they asserted that at least seventy-three percent of the sterling
silver Tiffany merchandise on eBay was counterfeit and that only a
definitive five percent was genuine. 5x Based on the results of this
survey, Tiffany demanded that eBay ban the sale of lots of five or
more Tiffany non-silver jewelry items, ban the sale of Tiffany silver
jewelry altogether (because most of it was counterfeit), and stop
advertising the sale of Tiffany merchandise completely. 59 Tiffany
subsequently sued eBay in New York federal district court. 60
In its complaint, Tiffany alleged that eBay was liable for
contributory trademark infringement "by virtue of the assistance that
it provides to, and the profits it derives from, individuals who sell
Tiffany counterfeit goods on eBay.,,61 The issue of first impression in
the case was whether an internet site such as eBay, which only acts as
an intermediary in transactions, may be liable for contributory
trademark infringement.
The Lanham Act does not specifIcally address contributory
trademark liability.62 However, the Supreme Court expressly
recognized liability for contributory trademark infringement in the
1982 case Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.rd After
numerous pharmacists sold generic pills as brand name drugs, Ives
Laboratories-manufacturer and distributor of the brand name
prescription drug Cyclospasmol-sued for damages and for
injunctive relief against companies which produced look-alike generic

56. Id. at 481.
57. Id. at 482.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
6l. Id. at 470.
62. See Brian D. Kaiser, Contributory Trademark Injl-inBcment by Internet Service
Providers: An Argument jor Limitation, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL'y 65, 86 (2002).
63. 456 U.S. 844 (J982).
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pills. 64 The District Court held that Inwood Laboratories and other
generic drug manufacturers were only liable for trademark
infringement if they encouraged the substitution, or if once they
knew about the substitution, continued to distribute to the
substituting pharmacists. 65 Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed
the ruling of the District Court, holding that a party is vicariously
liable for contributory trademark infringement only when that party
actually encouraged or participated in the infringement. 66
The Supreme Court noted that contributory trademark
infringement could arise in either of two ways. First, although not
pertinent to the facts in Inwood) infringement may occur if one party
purposefully induces another to infringe a trademark. 67 Second,
contributory infringement may attach to one who, as "a
manufacturer or distributor ... continues to supply its product to
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement."6H Because Inwood had no personal contact with
pharmacists and there were only a few instances of pill substitution,
the Court held that there was no reason for Inwood or other generic
drug manufacturers to know of the pill substitutions. 69
When analyzing eBay in light of this second type of
infringement, the issue in Tiffany was whether eBay knew or should
have known about the infringements of Tiffany'S trademarks
occurring on the site. eBay did not dispute that it possessed a general
knowledge of the fact that some isolated items being sold on the site
were counterfeit, especiaIly in light of Tiffany's Notice of Claimed
Infringements (NOCls), its own fraud engine, and complaints from
buyers about counterfeit Tiffany items sold on eBay?O Thus, the
Court was forced to determine whether this "generalized
knowledge" was sufficient to require atl-lrmative action by eBay to
avoid contributory infringement liability.71
eBay argued that generalized knowledge alone is insufficient to
meet the knowledge requirement of Inwood's second contributory
infringement category, asserting that not all Tiffany goods sold on

64. Id.
65. Id. at 852.
66. Id.
67. Tifrany, Inc v. tRay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
68. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854.
69. Id. at 852~53.
70. Tifl/my, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 508, 5 II.
71. Id. at 508.
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eBay are counterfeit. 72 eBay argued that Inwood requires the third
party to receive specific knowledge of the infringement, either
independently or in the form of notice from the rights owner. 73 eBay
had a mechanism in place for specific notice-VeRO, which it
encouraged Tiffany to utilize. 74 Nevertheless, Tiffany argued that
eBay was "willfully blind" by not investigating or understanding the
counterfeiting on its site. 75
The district court in Tiffany held that under Inwood, the "reason
to know" standard may be met by demonstrating that the
"defendant was willfully blind to the infringing activity. ,,76 To be
willfully blind, "a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately
fail to investigate.,,77 Willful blindness also requires "more than mere
negligence or mistake";7K it requires that defendants keep themselves
ignorant of suspicious behavior?'} Despite eBay's general knowledge
of counterfeit goods selling on its site, however, the court found that
eBay attempted to eliminate the problem through its fraud engine
and VeRO. These efforts demonstrate that eBay did suspect
wrongdoing and made efforts to investigate through technological
and human measures, including dedicating employees to monitoring
listings. so
Ultimately, the court held that eBay was not liable for
contributory trademark infringement. xl If the court had found eBay
willfully blind under these circumstances, the decision would have
transformed the "reason to know" standard into an afllrmative duty
to fight against counterfeiting, even without specific knowledge. x2
Furthermore, if generalized knowledge of infringement were
sufllcient, Tiffany (and other trademark owners) could prevent
owners who had previously purchased goods with no conditions on

72. Id. at S09.
73. Id. at S08.
74. Id. at 478, SI4-IS.
7S. Id.atSI3.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Kike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. SlIpp. 2d 1352, 1369-70 (S.D.
Ga.2003) (cited in Tiff/my, 576 F. SlIpp. 2d at SIS).
79. Tiff/my, S76 F. SlIpp. 2d at SIS; see Hard Rock Cate Licensing Corp. v. Concession
Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 1992).
80. Tiffany, S76 F. SlIpp. 2d at 476-79.
81. Id. at S27.
82. Id.atS1S.
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their disposal or resale from reselling their items. x3 Owners of TifImy
goods did not purchase those goods on the condition that they
would not subsequently be able to resell the goods-such a
restriction might have resulted in lower initial prices for the goods.
Allowing Tiffany to exercise this power would run contrary to one of
the purposes of trademark law embodied in the Lanham Act-to
enable the public to purchase (and resell) goods with confidence,M
not to enable trademark owners to exert complete and continued
control over products carrying their marks.
A business such as eBay has an economic incentive to ensure that
users are happy with their goods, both because they receive a final
value fee from each successful sale, and because mischaracterized
goods require additional time and resources for resolving disputes
and grievances. X5 Trademark rights are to some extent a public good,
but commentators generally agree that they fundamentally represent
the private rights of the trademark owner. H6 As a holder of a private
right, a trademark owner bears personal responsibility for enforcing
his right in the trademark. Xl Based on evidence presented by eBay,
Tiffany spent few of its own resources in monitoring the eBay site to
ensure that infringement was not occurring, but sought instead to
pass that expense on to eBay. xx
Tiffany's motives were also suspect. Had Tiffany been concerned
only with counterfeit goods, it would not have suggested the fiveitems-or-more rule as a blanket rule that applied to both new and
old Tiffany goods.Xl) According to evidence presented by eBay,
Tiffany's retail stores instituted a similar rule as an anti-diversion tool
rather than an anti-counterfeiting tool. As such, the court reasoned

83. Id. at 473.

84. Joseph D. Garon, The Lanham Act: A LivinlJ ThinlJ, 7 FOR])HAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 55, 55-56 (1996).
85. See eI~ay, About Our Buyer Protection Programs, http://pages.ebay.com/help/
buy/protection-programs.html#bpp (last visited Aug. 21,2009); eBay, What Does It Cost to
Sell on eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/questions/what-fees.html (last visited Aug.
21,2009).
86. See Katherine E. Gasparek, AP#vinlJ the Fair Use Defmse in Traditional Trademark
InfrinlJement and Dilution Cases to Internet Meta Tal{qinlJ or LinkinlJ Cases, 7 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 787, 795-96 (1999).
87. Id. at 799.
88. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 484-85. Limited resources were budgeted by Tiffany
f()r combating the problem of online counterfeiting with only $763,000 budgeted in 2003.
That amount represented only 0.05% of net sales in 2003 despite the "rampant" nature of
counterfeit goods on eBay.
89. Id. at 483.
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that Tiffany was more concerned about the resale of authentic
Tiffany goods purchased directly from their stores than they were
about the sale of counterfeit items. YO For example, Tiffany has
allowed a single buyer to buy twenty-five pieces at a time in its retail
store. 9 ! Tiffany's fixation with the fIve-items-or-more rule suggests
that Tiffany was most concerned about remaining the exclusive
provider of Tiffany goods. n However, as the Court identifIed in its
opinion, no information was provided regarding "the actual size and
scope of the legitimate secondary market in authentic Tiffany silver
jewelry" that was at issue. 93 Insofar as secondary markets are
concerned, the Court further concluded, "eBay and other online
market websites may properly promote and facilitate the growth of
legitimate secondary markets in brand name goods. "Y4
Under the rule enunciated in Tiffany, it is clear that for a party
to be liable for contributory trademark infringement, there must be
specifIc knowledge of trademark infringement, and in the face of
such specific knowledge, the defendant must choose not to act.
While eBay was generally aware of counterfeit TifFany goods on its
site, it made efforts on its own and in cooperation with rights owners
to eliminate the sale of counterfeit goods. 9S In summary, the Tiffany
court held that the knowledge requirement in contributory
trademark infringement suits is not satisfIed by merely showing
general knowledge of counterfeit goods sales or by a showing of
simple negligence. 96
The approach to trademark law articulated in the Tiffany case is,
to the great dismay of eBay, unique to the United States. In both
Germany and France, as described below, no knowledge requirement
exists. Therefore, in contrast to the Tiffany court's fInding, eBay may
be held liable under tort theories of negligence and vicarious liability
in those jurisdictions.

v. GERMANY: ROLEX, INC. V. EBAY, INC.
The decision in Rolex) Inc. v. eBay) Inc., implies that eBay's
methods for tracking and eliminating counterfeit items are
90.
9l.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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insufficient. The decision also suggests that an increased affirmative
duty may be placed on eBay to monitor its listings. The result of the
ruling could be to restrict sellers' ability to vend products at the price
they determine, and to place an unreasonable burden on eBay.
Montres Rolex S.A. (Rolex) was founded in London in 1905 as
Wilsdorf and Davis. By 1919 the company moved to Geneva,
Switzerland, and began doing business under its current name.'!l
Rolex watches are known for their superb movement and hand
craftsmanship.YX As a leading company in the luxury goods industry,
its products are known as portable status symbols, just like Tiffany
jewelry.'!') A typical Rolex watch costs over $7,000. 100 Rolex holds
national and community trademarks in Germany and the European
Union.101 Like Tiffany, Rolex grew concerned with the number of
counterfeit products with the Rolex marks being sold on eBay,
especially on eBay.de, the German site.
A myriad of watches listed on eBay.de between June 7,2000 and
January 25, 2001 were labeled "Rolex" or were embossed with its
other trademarks such as the stylized crown.102 Some items were
described as "Rolex-like" or "Rolex replica.,,103 In a cease-and-desist
letter sent to eBay.de dated September 8, 2000,104 Rolex argued that
the "very low reserve price in comparison to the list of the original
watches was suHicient to give rise to a suspicion of a trademark
infringement. ,,105
eBay.de refused to comply with Rolex's request to cease the sale
of counterfeit items bearing the Rolex names and marks.

97. Hautehoriogerie.org, Rolex Story, http://www.hautehoriogerie.org/en/players/
brands/rolex/rolex.html (last visited Aug. 21,2009).
98. Shelly Branch, Why Vintacqe Watches Sur,..qed 20% in the Past 18 Months,
CNNMoNELC()M,
May
I,
1997, http://l11oney.cnIl.com/magazines/moIleymag/
moneyma~archive/1997 /05/01/225689/index.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2009).
99. Id.
100. Galt.com, Roiex Watches, http://www.galttech.com/research/tlshion/rolexwatches.php. This is the average cost t<lr a brand new watch, but even an authorized seller,
such as Essential Watches of Beveriy Hills, sells a coveted pre-owned model like the Explorer II
t<lr thousands below retail. See, c.H., Essential Watches.com, Rolex Explorer II Circa 2000White Dial 16570, http://www.essential-watches.com/Rolex- Used-16570- Explorer-II-Circa2000-White-Dial-IOI64.aspx (last visited Aug. 21,2009).
10 1. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH J [Federal Coun of JusticeJ Apr. 19, 2007,
Entschicdungcn des Bundesgerichtshotes in Zivilsachcn [BGHZJ 1149 (F.R.G.).
102. Id.at1150.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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Consequently, Rolex sought injunctive relief from the courts. The
cease-and-desist order sought by Rolex requested that cBay "cease
and desist from marketing [items bearing the ROLEX Community
trademarks] . .. when supplying watches. .. and using them or
permitting them to be used [in internet auctions] ... if and insofar
as the bid reveals that the goods offered arc not from the business
owned by [RO LEX]. ,,106 Both lower courts refused to issue the
order on the basis that an internet auctioneer, such as eBay, could
not be held liable for trademark infringement by an auctioneer's
offer. 107 Rolex appealed the decisions of the lower courts. lOX
By applying for injunctive relief, Rolex forestalled eBay from
claiming the "host provider privilege" under the EC Directive on
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) because it does not apply to
injunctive relief. 109 If eBay had been able to seek relief under the
directive, it would have been shielded from liability. The EC
Directive operates in a manner similar to the Inwood test in the
United States, in that it requires specific knowledge of the
infringement. liD The EC Directive holds that a provider is not liable
if it did not have actual knowledge of the illegal behavior, or if it
acted expeditiously to remove the information once it obtained such
information. I I I
The Bundesgerichtshof(German Federal Supreme Court) (BGH)
remanded the case to the appellate court for further findings of fact,
holding that a provider could be liable as a storer (disquieter) for
obvious and clear infringements if the platform enables the offering
106. Simon Chapman et a!., Has Time Run Out jilr Internet Auction Sites, Oct. 15,
2007, http://www.ifu·.com/publications/ all/articles/has-time-run -()ut-ti)r-internet.aspx.
107. Id.
lOS. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice 1 Apr. 19, 2007,
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshotes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 1149 (1156) (F.R.G.), 2007
E.T.M.R. 70; Chapman et a!., supra note 106. Under §§ Sand 11 of Act on the Utilization of
Teleservices (Gesetz uber die Nutzung von Telediensten) (2001), an internet service provider
such as eBay is not liable tt)r third-party content unless it has knowledge of such content and
can be reasonably expected to block the use of such content. The BGH in its opinion,
however, suggested that case law decided after the intermediate court decision dictates that the
sections it relied on ti)r its decision do not apply to prohibitory injunctions.
109. European Community Directive on Electronic Commerce (EC) No. 2000/31 of S
June 2000 art. 14,2000 O.J. (L 17S) 1. "Host provider privilege," as defined in art. 14, § I,
states that a service provider may not be held liable ti)r illegal content stored at the request of
the recipient of the service on condition that (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge
of the illegal activity or intimnation or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to enable access to the int'>rIllation.
110. Id.
Ill. Id.
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of counterfeit productS. 112 Although the Community Trade Mark
Regulation does not recognize liability for intermediaries, the BGH
held that the provision on prohibitory injunctions, which had been
left to individual member states to interpret, had to be supplemented
to create liability for intermediaries. ll3 The court also applied Article
11 of the European Enforcement Directive (Directive) .114 The
Directive obliges Member States to ensure that in the case of
intellectual property infringement, the holder of the rights may apply
for an injunction "against intermediaries whose services are used by a
third party to infringe an intellectual property right." 115 Recital 23 of
the Directive states that the procedures for the injunctions are
determined by the individual member states. I 16
Under Article 14, § 3 of the EC Directive, the law of a member
state controls and a member state may require a "service provider to
terminate or prevent an infringement.,,117 If a member state's law
requires a service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement
by injunction, eBay has an afiirmative duty not to allow future
infringement. eBay may comply by either having the appropriate
means in place to prevent infringement or by not selling Rolex items
at all.
Because European Community law leaves open whether eBay
may be liable as an intermediary for the actions of another, the court
was free to apply German law. A stijrer or disquieter in German law is
one who "knowingly participated in an infringing action.,,118 Under
this type of liability, one must not be negligent or purposefully act,
but one must willingly contribute to the action. 119
The BGH reverted the case to the Appellate Court in Dusseldorf
to determine whether eBay's existing preventive measures were
112. Chapman et ai., sttpra note 106.
113. Id.; sa Council Regulation 40/94, Community Trade Mark, art. 98, § 2, 1994 O.J.
(L II) I; Bundesgerichtshof lBGHJ [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007,
Entschiedungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 1149 (1159) (F.R.G.).
114. Chapman et ai., supra note 106 (noting BGHZ 1149, (1159); Council Directive
2004/48, Enf(Jrcement ofintellectual Property Rights, art. 11,2004 O.J. (L 157) 45, 76).
liS. Chapman et ai., supra note 106 (citing Bundesgerichtshof[BGH] [Federal Court of
Justice 1Apr. 19,2007, Entschiedungen des Bundesgerichtshotes in Zivilsachen [BGHZlI149
(1159) (F.R.G.); Council Directive 2004/48, at 76).
116. Chapman et ai., supra note 106 (noting Council Directive 2004/48, at 54).
117. Chapman et ai., supra note 106 (citing Council Directive 2000/31, Electronic
Commerce, art. 14,2000 O.J. (L 178) I, 13).
118. Gesetz tiber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [German Copyright Law]
[UrhGl, § 97 I S.l.
119. /d.
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sufficient and, if not, what preventive measures may be considered as
"technically possible and reasonable.,,120 The remand, however, did
not clarify whether eBay acted knowingly in allowing infringement
to occur on its site despite the measures it had in place (the fraud
engine, VeRO, and manual searches by its employees). The decision
by the German courts requires that eBay take all possible measures to
avoid any infringements in the future. Arguably, if the facts of
Tiffany are accurate, eBay has already been doing this.l2l Yet, by
ruling as it did, the BGH implied that these measures are insufficient.
Indeed, eBay must take additional precautions, limited to the extent
that those precautions endanger eBay's business model. The cost of
additional monitoring will likely dissuade eBay from allowing
auctions of Rolex watches, thus ensuring that the listing does not
infringe on Rolex's rights.
The German court went further than simply remanding the issue
of preventive measures. It also suggested that there ought to be
triggering mechanisms, such as a starting price of less than €SOO
(about $1000), that might obligate eBay to prevent infringement. 122
However, such requirements may place unreasonable burdens on
eBay and on customers wishing to sell or purchase Rolex watches.
A triggering mechanism that requires a low starting price as
conclusive evidence of infringement will require eBay to investigate
based on general knowledge. It will also deny the right of legitimate
Rolex owners to re-sell their items on eBay under the terms that they
desire (which may also be very desirable to purchasers as well),
without being provided notice when purchasing the watch, that they
would be limited in any way in their ability to resell their item on the
secondary market. Thus, the rule suggested by the BGH is overly
extensive.
VI. FRANCE: LVMH V. EBAY, INC.
Enabling intellectual property owners to control the secondary
market restricts the original purchaser's right to re-sell his or her
items. Yet allowing the intellectual property owners the right to
control the secondary market for their goods is precisely the result of

120. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007,
Entschiedungen des Bundesgerichtshotes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 1149 (1160) (F.R.G.).
121. See Tift'any, Inc. v. eEay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
122. Bundesgerichtshof [EGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007,
Entschiedungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZlI149 (F.R.G.).
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the french decisions against eBay. Three cases by luxury goods
producers against eBay in France illustrate how intellectual property
owners are using trademark laws to hinder eBay's reasonable business
activities and further unfair business practices against eBay consumers
and sellers in france.
Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy (LVMH) was created in 1987
when Bernard Amault merged storied luxury brands Louis Vuitton
and Moet Hennessy.123 Throughout the 1990s, LVMH acquired
additional luxury brands, including Thomas Pink, Chaumet jewelry,
Fendi leather goods, the Pucci and Donna Karan fashion lines, Krug
champagne, and TAG Heuer watches. 124 LVMH employs the "star
brand" formula, which Arnault explains as "[s]harply defin[ing] the
brand identity by mining the brand's history and find[ing] the right
designer to express it, creat[ing] masterful marketing buzz, and
tightly control[ling] quality and distribution.,,125 Sales of both
counterfeit and legitimate LVMH goods on eBay destroy the efforts
of LVMH to tightly control quality and distribution. In this effort,
LVMH has investigated individual sellers and distributors of
counterfeit goods and sued eBay and other internet service providers
like Google. 126
In 2006, LVMH filed three suits against eBay in the Tribunal de
Commerce de Paris (France's Commercial Court), accusing eBay of
listing counterfeit goods for sale on its site. 127 All three decisions
were announced on June 30, 2008. I2S In the two non-fragrancerelated suits, LVMH alleged that since 1999, eBay has refused to
take effective measures against counterfeiting by requiring sellers to

123. Janet Guyon, The MaBic Touch, FORTUNE, Sep. 6, 2004, available at
http:// m( mel' .cnn .C( )In/ magazin es/ti >rtLlI1e /f' >rtuncarchive /2004 /09 /06/380345 /index.
htm.
124. Id.
125. Slavin Marinovich, Louis Vuittlm, BRANnCHANNEL.COM, Nov. 13, 2006,
http://www.brandchannel.com/features_profile.asp?pcid=31 O.
126. Id. LVMH employs a dedicated staff to deal with anti-counterfeiting eff,>rts and
employs other agents, investigators, and lawyers to investigate and prosecute counterfeiting.
Similar to what has been done in the entertainment industry, LVMH is trying to educate the
public about the counterteiting problem.
127. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eBay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.C]
[Commercial Court 1 Paris, June 30, 2008; Christian Dior Couture v. eBay, Tribunal de
Commerce de Paris [T.Cl [CommCfcial Court] Paris, June 30,2008; SA Parnlms Christian
Dim ,'. eBay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.C] [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30,
2008.
128. However, the case involving the LVMH group's fragrance brands utilized a different
legal theory than the other two cases and will be discussed separately.
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ensure the authenticity of goods or to otherwise close the account of
a seller as soon as it was found to sell counterfeits. J2<I LVMH also
argued that eBay's new technological measures in 2006 aimed at
preventing the sale of counterfeit goods proved its past negligence in
failing to more proactively prevent the sale of infringing goods on its
site. 130 LVMH alleged in its complaint that of 300,000 Dior-branded
items and 150,000 Louis Vuitton bags ottered on eBay during the
first six months of 2006, 90% were counterfeit. 131 The Tribunal de
Commerce found eBay liable for the damage under a negligence
theory, determining that like the German court in Rolex, eBay had
not taken sufficient measures to prevent transactions involving
infringing items on its site. 132
Once again, eBay argued that it was a mere host and as such
could not be held liable under Article 6 of the Act on ConfIdence in
the Digital Economy-an act which protects businesses that provide
host services. 133 The Commercial Court dismissed eBay's argument
and applying the analysis of the court in Tiffany, held that eBay was
not merely passively involved in the transactions that occurred on its
site, but should be considered a broker. The court believed that
eBay's provision of marketing tools to sellers with information on
brands, eBay's ability to create virtual stores, and eBay's ability to
become a PowerSeller were sufficient to consider it a broker. 134 eBay
acted as it did to earn the commission (listing fees and final value
fees), and could thus be considered an intermediary. These actions
were also the actions that the Tiffany court cited in determining that
eBay had sufficient control to be considered more than a mere host,
and thus could in principle be found liable for contributory
trademark infringement. 135
As in Tiffany and Rolex, LVMH alleged that eBay failed to

129. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.C. Paris at
7 A.

130. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at
7 A.

131. Brokate, supra note 42, at 628.
132. SA Louis Vuittoll Malletier, T.e. Paris at 12 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris
at 12 A.
133. Amdie Blocman, Constitutional Council Publishes its Decision on the Act on
Confidence in the Digital Economy, July 10, 2004, http://merlin.obs.we.int/
sh< )w. php?t()rmat~pdt&iris_r~2004%207%20 18.
134. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 11 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at
12 A.
135. Tiftanv, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2(08).
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remove listings of known intellectual property infringers or to close
accounts of repeat offenders. 136 The Tribunal de Commerce
considered eBay's preventative measures in 2006 as efforts to
mitigate the effects of its past negligence. 137 eBay's apparent
knowledge of improper activity was sufficient to satisty the court that
eBay was negligent in taking adequate measure to combat the
problem.13x The Tribunal fined eBay a staggering €38.6 million
(almost $54 million) for financial and reputational damage in the
three cases, and imposed daily fines for eBay's failure to remove
listings and advertisements containing LVMH goods. 139
The court emphasized that counterfeiting is the "scourge of the
legal economy," and that eBay's inaction is what perpetuates the
position of LVMH as a victim of counterfeiting. 140 The fact that eBay
removes infringing listings, and has a mechanism in place for doing
so in VeRO, did not refrain the court from finding eBay negligent,
nor did the fact that LVMH elected to not participate in VeRO to
monitor eBay and to prevent infringement. 141 The court found eBay
grossly negligent, thus imposing a strict duty on eBay to prevent the
sale of infringing goods on its site. 142 Practically speaking, requiring
eBay to establish additional measures to combat infringement simply
makes it more cost-prohibitive to allow the sale of luxury goods on
the site at all.
The LVHM case affects items legitimately sold on the secondary
market as seen in the third of the three French cases, the Parfurns
case. Christian Dior, Kenzo, Guerlain and Givenchy are LVMH

136. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at
7 A.
137. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at
7 A.
138. SA Louis Vuittlm Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at
7 A.

139. SA LouiJ Vuittlm Malletier, Te. Paris at 17 A-18 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.C.
Paris at 17 A-IS A; SA PartLIITIS Christian Dior v. tBay, Tribunal de COITIITItrct de Paris
[T.e.] [Commercial Court] Paris I A, 18A-19 A (Junt 30, 2008) translated in
http://kgalpad.bl()gs.t()rtllne.cnn.(()1TI/2008/10/08/tBay-rulings-rdating-t()«) un te rtC iti n g -en gl ish -tran sl ati () ns/.
140. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 9 A; Christian Dior Couture, Te. Paris at
9A.
141. SA Louis VuittlJ11 Malletier, Te. Paris at 12 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at
12 A.
142. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 12 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at
12 A.
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perfume brands. 143 Perfume companies requested that the
government fine eBay 000,000 per day to prevent distribution of
LVMH brand perfume advertisements, and that eBay also be flned
for allowing perfume listings originating in France or allowing buyers
in France to bid on the listing. 144 The perfume companies prevailed,
receiving separate damages of €3.2 million as well as injunctions. 145
In defending against the claims in the Parfums case, eBay argued
that the VeRO program and other anti-counterfeiting measures
protected the plaintitl's intellectual property rights to the best of
eBay's ability.146 In France, goods are marketed in approved physical
points of sale that are part of a framework of a selective distribution
network. 147 A selective distribution network is a system in which a
supplier or in this case, a manufacturer such as LVMH, agrees to
supply products to approved distributors, and the distributors agree
to sell to only end users or distributors within the network. 14M Article
81 (1) of the Treaty that established the European Community
prohibited all agreements and concerted practices that might have an
effect on trade between the Member States and are designed to
"prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common
market." 149 However, an exemption is available under Article 81 (3)
for vertical agreements for the supply of goods and services,
irrespective of whether the goods or services are supplied for resale
or for use. ISO Selective distribution networks are therefore permitted
under this exception to European Community Regulation (EC)
2790j1999. 1s1 A further requirement for the exemption is that the
supplier must fall below a market-share cap.
The market-share cap requirement is of particular relevance in
the Parfums case. Article 3( 1) of the Regulation limits the
exemption to suppliers whose "market share . . . does not exceed
30% of the relevant market on which it sells the contract goods or

143. LVMH, Pernunes and Cosmetics, http://w\\.w.lvmh.com/.
144. SA Parfums Christian Dior, T.c. Paris at 2-3 A.
145. Id.§4A.
146. Id.
147. Id. § I A.
148. Practical Law Company, Selective Distribution, http://corporate.practicallaw.com/
8-107-7235.
149. Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 81(3)
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
ISO. Id.
151. Commission Regulation 2790/1999, On the Application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21.
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services. ,,1,,2 eBay argued that LVMH's selective distribution network
for perfumes did not qualify, indicating that LVMH possessed only
23.9% of the selective distribution perfume market. 153 However, this
percentage did not account for LVHM's market shares in the
cosmetics market or market shares of sister companies under the
LVMH umbrella. ls4 eBay argued that before a fine could be
implemented for its failure to stop listings and sales of LVMH
perfumes on eBay.tr, a hearing should be held before the
Competition Council to determine whether the selective distribution
network for LVMH was in violation of Article 81 (1).155
Instead of ordering further fact-flnding on the LVMH selective
distribution network, the court addressed the manner in which sites
such as eBay undermine and victimize selective distribution
networks. I "6 The court failed to consider the possibility that the
selective distribution network might facially meet the criteria for an
exception but still frustrate the purpose of Article 81 (1 )-promotion
of competition between the Member States.
The injunction granted in the Parfums case far exceeds
protecting the selective distribution network. By making it
impossible to list LVMH perfumes on eBay.tr or to purchase such
perfumes when listed in other countries, the injunction is now
effectively restricting even legitimate sales of the perfumes on the
secondary market.
Such an injunction directly contradicts the "first sale" doctrine
under U.S. law. This doctrine provides that a trademark owner has
no right to control the distribution of its trademarked product after
its flrst sale (with certain exceptions such as contracting for that
right).157 Under this doctrine, resale of a trademarked item by the
original purchaser is neither trademark infringement nor unfair
competition.ls~ The flrst sale doctrine is designed to (1) allocate the

152. EC Treaty, supra note 148.
IS3. SA ParhlITIS Christian Dior v. eRay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.C.]
l Commercial Court] Paris, June 30,2008 at 5 A.
154. Id. § 6A.
15S. Id.
IS6. Id.
157. Prestol1cttes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359,368 (1924).
158. Sebastian Intern., Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 r.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir.
1995). For cases where U.S. courts have applied the doctrine, see, e.g., NEC Electronics v.
CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987); Matrix Essentials v. Emporium
Drug Mart, 988 F.2d 587, 593 (5th Cir.1993); H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Medical Sys.,
879 F.2d 1005, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989). The doctrine's premise also finds expression in the
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brand identification benefIts to the manufacturer, and (2) to assure
the consumer that he is receiving a genuine version of the product. 159
However, at the same time the doctrine limits the manufacturer's
control over the product by creating terminating that control after
the first sale. 160 Secondary sales on eBay fall within this doctrine
because the doctrine protects eBay buyers seeking discounts from
secondary owners.
The first sale doctrine exists within European Union law as well.
However, the applicable regulations in the European Union allow
only for community-wide exhaustion; the doctrine does not apply to
trademarked goods that the maker places on the market outside of
the community.161 Still, given that the first sale doctrine does exist in
some form in all three jurisdictions, it lends credence to eBay's
allegation that the actions of the luxury goods makers are nothing
more than a means to prevent competition. In a press release after
the French decisions, eBay declared that the decisions had nothing
to do with counterfeits but rather were an "attempt by LVMH to
protect uncompetitive commercial practices at the expense of
consumer choice and the livelihood of law-abiding sellers that eBay
empowers every day.,,162 eBay further argued that the French
decisions deny consumers the basic market freedom to determine
from whom they buy their goods. 163
VII. WHO SHOULD BEAR THE EXPENSE?

Generally, luxury goods makers in France, under the umbrella
groups of the Comite Colbert and CNAC, cooperate with each
other and with the government to combat counterfeits by punishing
offenders and educating the public. 1M Conversely, some luxury
goods makers, such as LVMH, think that eBay should bear complete
responsibility for monitoring its own site. It is true that eBay profits
Restatement (Third) ofUntair Competition § 24 cmt. b (1995): "IT]rademark owner cannot
ordinarily prevent or control the sale of goods bearing the mark once the owner has permitted
those goods to enter commerce."
159. Sebastian Intern., Inc, 53 F.3d at 1075.
160. Id.
161. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, First Directive to Approximate the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) I; Community Trade Mark
Regulation [EC] No. 40/94 of20 Jan. 1994, 1994 O.J. (L 11) l.
162. eBaylnk,
eBay Vows to Fight
Following Overreach
by
LVMH,
http://eBayinkblog.C<lln/2008/06/30/eBay-v()\\'s-to-tight-t()1l()wing-()I'erreach-by-Ivmh/.
163. Id.
164. Le Berre, supra note 9; Comite Colbert, supra note 13.
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from the sale of goods on its site, but it also makes efforts through
VeRO and its other programs to fight counterfeiting. 165 No one is in
a better position than Tiffany to be able to identifY an original
Tiffany product from a counterfeit, yet Tiffany will only authenticate
a product if it is shown to be purchased from a Tiffany store, which
would actually remove the need for authentication. 166 Even when a
maker such as Tiffany authenticates a good on eBay, it can only
accurately determine if a good is genuine seventy-eight percent of
the time~ 167 How could eBay, which sells hundreds of thousands of
different brands on a daily basis, be expected to authenticate all the
brands and their marks, when the mark holders themselves cannot
identifY their own mark a hundred percent of the time? The Lanham
Act strikes an appropriate balance and ensures protection for
trademarks. The Act provides information to consumers while
recognizing that a trademark is a private right that requires the
holder to be ultimately responsible. 168
Buyers on eBay could also take more responsibility for the
counterfeits they find on the site. Like other national sites, eBay.fr
has a page that details how it protects intellectual property rights. 169
On the bottom of each listing, there is a link entitled signaler cet
objet, "to announce this item.,,17o By clicking on this button, one can
report an item directly to eBay.fr for intellectual property rights
infringement. The infringement could be because of a prohibition on
selling the item on the site, or for infringing the copyright or
trademark of another. l7l By allowing consumer reporting, eBay.fr
allows its customers to participate in combating counterfeit goods.
Although the level of motivation to report differs for individuals in
France where the purchase of counterfeit goods is a crime, the same
system may work worldwide.172 Even ordinary consumers will often
know the general value of items they want to purchase. If they see a
bargain that is too good to be true or an item that looks suspicious,
they can report it to eBay for further investigation. Also, by allowing
165. What Does It Cost to Sell on eRay, supra note 85; How eRay Protects Intellectual
Property, supra note 43.
166. Tiffany, InL v. eRay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 517 n.39 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
167. Sec id. at 482.
168. Garon, supra note 84, at 56; see Gasparek, supra note 86, at 799.
169. eRay.tr, Imp:!/www.eRay.tr.
170. ld.
171. eRay.tr, Aide eRay: Nous Contacter, http://pages.eRay.fr/help/contaccus/_basel
index_4.html?tierO=reporc listing.js&item= 140289067588 (last visited Aug. 21,2009).
172. Le Rerre, mpra note 9.
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consumers to report, they become more aware of the procedures that
eBay has in place to fight counterfeiting, thereby rebuilding
confidence in the authenticity of eBay goods. Involving consumers
and trademark holders is one way to preserve the secondary market
for luxury goods on eBay and prevent trademark infringement.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Over the past two years, eBay has received diametrical litigation
outcomes in Europe and at home. European and American courts
fundamentally disagree about the legal sufficiency of eBay's anticounterfeiting efforts. The European decisions ultimately threaten to
destroy eBay's business model, while the American result leaves
consumers with little recourse against fly-by-night sellers. While
reducing the trade of counterfeit goods is an admirable goal, it
should not come at the cost of legitimate owners' ability to sell an
unwanted product. eBay can only continue to be a viable secondary
market for luxury goods by taking a multi-pronged approach:
continue to independently police the eBay sites, cooperate with
intellectual property holders, and encourage consumers to be
proactive in stopping the sale of counterfeit goods through a revived
ethic of caveat emptor.
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